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ABA ACCREDITATION OF LAW SCHOOLS:
AN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS
Andy Portinga*
The accreditation activities of the American Bar Association are
under attack. From within legal academia, professors and deans
complain that the ABA accreditation process is overly formalistic
and intrusive. In addition, the Massachusetts School of Law has
sued the ABA, alleging that the ABA's accreditation standards
violate the Sherman Act. From outside legal academia, the Depart-
ment of Justice has investigated the ABA's accreditation activities
and initiated an antitrust suit against the ABA. The Department
of Justice and the ABA immediately settled this suit, and, as a
result of this settlement, the ABA has agreed not to enforce certain
standards and to review other standards. In this Note, the author
analyzes the applicability of the Sherman Act to the accreditation
of law schools and concludes that law school accreditation is
within the scope of the Act. The author further reviews the anti-
trust implications of the individual accreditation standards and
suggests changes to questionable standards. The author argues
that the ABA should establish a strong link between each standard
and a legitimate educational goal in order to avoid any antitrust
problems.
INTRODUCTION
The history of the legal profession is to a great extent, and
despite noisy and incessant protestation and apologetics,
the history of efforts by all branches of the profession,
including the professoriat and the judiciary, to secure a
lustrous place in the financial and social-status sun.'
When the American Bar Association (ABA) denied accredi-
tation to the Massachusetts School of Law at Andover (MSL),2
* Executive Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Volume 29,
1996. B.A. 1992, Kalamazoo College; M.P.P. 1996, University of Michigan; J.D. 1996,
University of Michigan Law School. I would like to thank Professor Merritt Fox,
Professor Kevin McDonnell, and Clare McDonnell for their helpful comments.
1. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAw 33 (1995).
2. A.B.A.'s Delegates Rebuff Law School on Denied Approval, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
9, 1994, at A19.
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many members of the legal community predicted that the
young school would not survive.3 Without ABA accreditation,
MSL graduates are extremely limited in career opportunities.
Forty-five states require that an applicant to the bar be a
graduate of an ABA-accredited law school.4 In addition, under
current ABA standards, students at unaccredited law schools
may not transfer academic credits to accredited law schools.'
MSL graduates, in effect, are limited to taking the Massachu-
setts bar examination.6
MSL, however, has not passively accepted its rebuff. The
school filed an antitrust claim against the ABA,7 charging that
the ABA's accreditation standards and procedures constitute
an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of section 1 of
the Sherman Act.8 Specifically, MSL alleged that the ABA
inflated faculty salaries, reduced teaching loads, increased the
cost of legal education, and prevented disadvantaged persons
from obtaining a legal education.9 MSL charged the ABA with
operating like a typical cartel, increasing price and reducing
output.10
3. Law schools that are denied ABA accreditation typically fail. See, e.g.,
Annand Ageshwa, Accreditation: To Have... and Have Not, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 8, 1990,
at 14 (discussing the closing of the 100-year-old Atlanta Law School after the Georgia
Supreme Court issued a rule that, beginning in 1998, only graduates of ABA-
approved schools can sit for the state bar exam).
4. Comprehensive Guide to Bar Admission Requirements, 1993-1994 A.B.A. SEC.
LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO BAR 10-12. Beginning in 1998, Georgia will require
that a bar applicant be either a graduate of or a third-year student at an ABA-
approved school. Id. at 11. Of the remaining four states, Connecticut requires either
a J.D. or an LL.M from an ABA-accredited school and Maine requires that a bar
applicant have completed at least two-thirds of her law school coursework at an ABA-
accredited school. Id.
5. AMERICAN BAR AsS'N, STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS AND
INTERPRETATIONS, Interpretation 3 of Standard 305 (1993) [hereinafter ABA STAN-
DARDS]. This standard, however, is being revised. See infra notes 20-21 and
accompanying text.
6. Ken Myers, Law Schools: Bar Eligibility, NAT'L L.J., June 11, 1990, at A4
(explaining that Massachusetts allows graduates of unaccredited in-state law schools
to sit for the bar if the state has approved the school).
7. Complaint, Massachusetts Sch. of Law v. American Bar Ass'n, No. 93-6206,
at 1-2 (E.D. Pa. 1993) [hereinafter Complaint], reprinted in Complaint: Massachusetts
School of Law at Andover, Inc. v. The American Bar Association, et al., MSL L. REV.,
Winter 1994, at 3, 4. One week after MSL filed its claim, the University of Honolulu
School of Law, located in Modesto, California, filed a similar suit against the Cali-
fornia Committee of Bar Examiners. Ken Myers, Law Schools: New Suit, NAT'L L.J.,
Dec 20, 1993, at A4.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
9. Complaint, supra note 7, at 15, reprinted in MSL L. REV. at 11.
10. PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 107, 484 (11th ed. 1980).
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Although one may be tempted to dismiss the MSL complaint
as "sour grapes," MSL is not alone in criticizing the accredita-
tion process. Shortly after MSL started its litigation, the deans
of fourteen law schools, including the University of Chicago,
Stanford, and Harvard, sent a letter to the deans of all ABA-
accredited law schools, calling for a reformation of the accredi-
tation process.11 The deans complained:
We find the current process overly intrusive, inflexible,
concerned with details not relevant to school quality (per-
haps even at odds with maintaining quality), and terribly
costly in administrative time as well as actual dollar costs
to schools....
It is this sense of responsibility that gives rise to our
concern that the accreditation process for law schools is
heading in the wrong direction. Our varied visions of legal
education focus on the results of the educational process,
on the outputs of legal education-about the sort of gradu-
ates we produce, about the sort of lives they will lead,
about the consequences of our writing and teaching. In
contrast, the ABA's accreditation process increasingly con-
centrates on inputs-how many seats are there in the
library, for example .... "
Within the law school community, several academics have
noted that the ABA historically has attempted to restrict entry
into the legal profession. 3 Although the ABA's attempts have
resulted in the imposition of minimum standards of quality
ostensibly designed to protect the public, 4 the restrictions
have often been self-serving. Professor Harry First of New
York University Law School has argued that when the ABA
gained control over legal education, "elite" law schools were
able to eliminate competition from low-cost competitors such
11. See An Open Letter to the Deans of the A.B.A. Accredited Law Schools, MSL
L. REV., Fall 1994, at 48, 49 [hereinafter Open Letter to Deans].
12. Id. at 49-50.
13. See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAwYERS 40-73 (1989); WILLIAM R. JOHN-
SON, SCHOOLED LAWYERS: A STUDY IN THE CLASH OF PROFESSIONAL CULTURES 153,
161-62 (1978); ROBERT B. STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA
FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980s, at 93-103 (1983); Harry First, Competition in the
Legal Education Industry (l), 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 333-401 (1979).
14. STEVENS, supra note 13, at 93-104.
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as night schools and proprietary schools.15 In addition, Judge
Richard A. Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit has argued that entry barriers to legal
academia have, in part, caused low-quality legal academic
writing.16 Posner has posited that law schools are "awash in
tuition income" and thus able to support numerous law jour-
nals.
1 7
Complaints about school accreditation also have drawn the
attention of federal antitrust enforcement agencies. After a
year-long investigation, the Department of Justice (DOJ)
filed suit against the ABA, alleging that the ABA's accredita-
tion activities violated the antitrust laws.'8 That same day,
the ABA and the DOJ entered into a consent decree, effec-
tively ending the suit.' 9 The decree prohibits the ABA from
fixing faculty salaries, from refusing to accredit for-profit law
schools, and from completely preventing member schools from
accepting course credits earned at non-ABA-accredited law
schools. 2' The consent decree also requires the ABA to estab-
lish a committee to review accreditation standards in six
other areas: student/faculty ratios, teaching loads, leaves of
absence, bar preparation classes, physical plant require-
ments, and allocation of resources by the law school or its
parent university. 2' Finally, the ABA must change the com-
position of its accreditation inspection teams. The teams
previously consisted primarily of law professors, but under
the consent decree law school deans or faculty may not com-
prise more than fifty percent of a team's personnel.22
15. First, supra note 13, at 347-51. The motive behind restricting entry into the
legal profession apparently was both economic and xenophobic. One prominent ABA
member noted the need to prevent "Russian Jew Boys" from entering the profession.
MSL v. ABA, Plaintiffs' Report to the Court on the Initial Phase of the Conspiracy,
MSL L. REV., Fall 1994, at 111, 112; see also STEVENS, supra note 13, at 93-103
(discussing attempts by Yale Law School to restrict admission of Jews and foreign-
ers).
16. POSNER, supra note 1, at 100-01.
17. Id. "Law professors can find publication outlets for their scholarship too
easily. . . ." Id. at 101.
18. Henry J. Reske, ABA Settles Antitrust Suit on Accreditation, A.B.A. J., Aug.
1995, at 24.
19. Id.; see also ABA Resolves Division's Charges of Fixing Salaries of Law
Faculty, 68 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1719, at 877 (June 29, 1995);
Justice Department and American Bar Association Resolve Charges that the ABA's
Process for Accrediting Law Schools was Misused, Department of Justice News
Release No. 95-363 (June 27, 1995).
20. 60 Fed. Reg. 39,421, 39,422 (1995).
21. Id. at 39,423.
22. Id. at 39,422.
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Although the parties entered into the consent decree the
same day the suit was filed, the decree did not become final
automatically. As required by the Antitrust Procedures and
Penalties Act,2 3 the DOJ submitted the consent decree for a
sixty-day comment period and awaited approval. The consent
decree, however, proved controversial. During the comment
period, which ran from August 3, 1995, to October 2, 1995,
numerous law professors, law schools, and private accrediting
agencies submitted comments, most opposing the decree.24
After the ABA agreed to the settlement, Joseph W. Bellacosa,
a judge on the New York Court of Appeals and then Chair of
the ABA's Council of the Section on Legal Education and
Admission to the Bar, resigned from his chairmanship in
protest.25
Many of the comments to the consent decree argued that
antitrust laws do not apply to accreditation of educational in-
stitutions in the same way that such laws apply to for-profit
businesses.26 Indeed, the question of whether educational
institutions are exempt from the antitrust laws has persisted
for decades.27 By entering into the consent decree, the ABA
and the DOJ have left the question unanswered.
This Note argues that the ABA's accreditation activities are
subject to the antitrust laws and that the ABA's past accredi-
tation activities violated these laws. This Note makes recom-
mendations on how specific accreditation standards should be
modified in order to promote educational quality without
violating the antitrust laws. Part I provides a brief overview
of the Sherman Act. Part II critiques the applicability of
antitrust laws to the accreditation of law schools. Part III
looks at certain past practices of the ABA that may have
violated section 1 of the Sherman Act and recommends chang-
es in specific accreditation standards.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h) (1994).
24. 60 Fed. Reg. 63,766, 63,768-863 (1995).
25. Ken Myers, Official Quits over ABA Pact: NY Judge Objects to Terms of
Antitrust Settlement, NAT'L L.J., July 17, 1995, at A6.
26. See, e.g., 60 Fed. Reg. 63,766, 63,770 (1995) (summarizing the comments of
Dr. Bernard Fryshman and four accrediting agencies).
27. See infra Part II.
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I. THE SHERMAN ACT-A BRIEF OVERVIEW
The Sherman Act28 is the backbone of American antitrust
law.29 The basic policy behind the Sherman Act is the preser-
vation of competition in trade and commerce, and conversely,
the prevention of cartels and monopolies.3 ° Section 1, which
prohibits contracts that unreasonably restrain trade, states
that "lelvery contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared
to be illegal."31
To establish a violation of section 1, a plaintiff must show
that (1) an agreement existed and (2) the agreement unrea-
sonably restrained trade.32 Even though the agreement re-
quirement presupposes the existence of at least two parties,
the Supreme Court has had little difficulty holding that a
professional or trade organization may be liable under section
1.33 The Supreme Court has ruled that a professional organi-
zation is a continuing conspiracy among its members.34
Although section 1 is written in absolute terms, the Su-
preme Court very early held that section 1 does not condemn
all agreements that restrain trade, but only those agreements
that "unreasonably" restrain trade.35 The reasonableness of a
restraint traditionally has rested on whether the restraint
promotes or inhibits competition." Even with the reasonable-
ness caveat read into section 1, the Supreme Court has held
that certain types of activities are so plainly anticompetitive
28. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994).
29. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 23
(1976).
30. Id.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
32. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 63-64 (1911).
33. E.g., National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679
(1978).
34. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
35. Standard Oil, 221 US. at 60, 64-65. The Court recognized that the Sherman
Act could not be read literally, since all contracts restrain trade to some extent. Id.
at 59-60; see also Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 ("Every
agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain,
is of their very essence.").
36. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927).
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that they can be deemed per se illegal. 7 Such activities in-
clude price fixing, 8 horizontal market allocation,3 9 and boy-
cotts targeting a competitor.40 Analysis under section 1,
therefore, has two levels: those restraints that are per se
illegal and those that are illegal under the rule of reason.4
II. DOES THE SHERMAN ACT APPLY TO
ABA ACCREDITATION ACTIVITIES?
A. Accreditation as Trade or Commerce
Because section 1 of the Sherman Act applies only to trade
or commerce, 42 any inquiry into whether the ABA's accredita-
tion practices violate the Sherman Act must begin with an
examination of whether the ABA's accreditation activities
constitute "trade or commerce."
The starting point for this analysis is Marjorie Webster
Junior College v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary
Schools. In Marjorie Webster, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that accredi-
tation ofjunior colleges was not trade or commerce for purpos-
es of the Sherman Act.44 In this case, Middle States, pursuant
to a long-standing policy of limiting accreditation to nonprofit
schools, denied accreditation to Marjorie Webster, a propri-
etary institution.45 The court of appeals held that Congress did
not intend the Sherman Act to apply to education, stating:
37. Engineers, 435 U.S. at 692.
38. See Trenton Potteries, 273 US. at 398.
39. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) ("One of the
classic examples of a per se violation of § 1 is an agreement between competitors at
the same level of the market structure to allocate territories in order to minimize
competition.").
40. Fashion Originators' Guild of Am. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457
(1941).
41. Engineers, 435 U.S. at 692. The "rule of reason" has become a term of art in
antitrust law, focusing not on the reasonableness of the challenged restraint but
rather on the restraint's competitive effects. Id. at 688.
42. See 15 US.C. § 1 (1994).
43. 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
44. Id. at 654-55.
45. Id. at 652-53.
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[Tihe proscriptions of the Sherman Act were 'tailored...
for the business world,' not for the noncommercial aspects
of the liberal arts and the learned professions....
I . . [Tihe process of accreditation is an activity distinct
from the sphere of commerce; it goes rather to the heart of
the concept of education itself.4"
In support of this conclusion, the court noted that Congress
has been silent on the question of whether the Sherman Act
applies to education. 4' The court did provide a caveat, howev-
er, stating that the antitrust laws would conceivably apply to
an accreditation standard that had "little other than a com-
mercial motive."48
Although Marjorie Webster seems to protect the ABA from
challenges to its accreditation activities, 49 the validity of
Marjorie Webster appears doubtful. Almost from the moment
the court released the opinion, Marjorie Webster generated
academic criticism.50 Despite the Court of Appeals' opinion, the
legislative history of the Sherman Act shows that Congress in-
tentionally used broad language and intended the Act to have
a wide application. The Supreme Court, in reviewing the lan-
guage and history of the Sherman Act, stated that "[1] anguage
more comprehensive is difficult to conceive." 5 The Court also
46. Id. at 654-55 (quoting Eastern R.R. President's Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 141 (1961)).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. In Donnelly v. Boston College, 558 F.2d 634 (1st Cir. 1977), the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit stated, in dicta, that law school activities do not
have a commercial motive, citing Marjorie Webster. 558 F.2d at 635. The principle of
Marjorie Webster never has been directly applied to law schools. In Zavaletta v.
American Bar Association, 721 F. Supp. 96 (E.D. Va. 1989), a district court granted
summary judgment to the ABA in an antitrust suit brought by the CBN University
School of Law. The court did not mention Marjorie Webster but instead held that the
accreditation standards did not constitute a restraint of trade because the law school
voluntarily submitted to the accreditation process. Id. Because virtually every state
requires bar applicants to be graduates of ABA-approved schools, the "voluntariness"
of the accreditation process seems suspect. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Comment, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1014 (1969) (supporting the rationale
of the district court opinion, which held that accreditation was commerce); Recent
Cases, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1912, 1920 (1971) (arguing that applying the Sherman Act
to accrediting bodies would not inhibit the pursuit of legitimate educational goals);
Recent Decisions, 56 VA. L. REV. 1492, 1499 (1970) ("The problem with the opinion
is that its departure from making an explicit reasonableness inquiry may act as a
shield for accrediting associations and other concerted educational activities that
would be struck down under a reasonableness examination.").
51. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944).
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stated that the legislative history "shows a carefully studied
attempt to bring within the Act every person engaged in
business whose activities might restrain or monopolize com-
mercial intercourse among the states."52 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court repeatedly has held that it will not require
application of the Sherman Act be rejustified every time it
encounters a new occupation or business.53
The court of appeals' weakest argument appears in its
assertion that the "historical reluctance of Congress to exercise
control in educational matters",5 4 implies that Congress did not
intend the Sherman Act to apply to educational institutions.
Certainly, congressional silence cannot be interpreted as creat-
ing an implicit exemption to the antitrust laws, especially
when one considers the laissez-faire economic atmosphere at
the time the Sherman Act was enacted.5 If, in fact, the
Sherman Act only applied to markets over which Congress has
historically exercised control, the scope of the Sherman Act
would be very narrow. In addition, Supreme Court case law
prior to Marjorie Webster established a heavy presumption
against implicit exemptions to the Sherman Act.5" Congress
can, and has, created express exemptions to the Sherman
Act.57 Therefore, if Congress had actually intended educational
institutions to be exempt, it presumably would have created
an express exemption.
In addition to the questionable reasoning of the court of
appeals, subsequent decisions have further weakened Marjorie
Webster. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,5" the Supreme
Court severely limited, and perhaps eliminated, the "learned
profession" exemption on which the court of appeals relied in
Marjorie Webster. In this case, the Court held that a minimum
52. Id.
53. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 351 (1982)
("ITihe argument that the per se rule must be rejustified for every industry that has
not been subject to significant antitrust litigation ignores the rationale for per se
rules ....").
54. Marjorie Webster Junior College v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges &
Secondary Sch., 432 F.2d 650, 654 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
55. See SAMUELSON, supra note 10, at 141-42.
56. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963);
California v. Federal Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482, 484 (1962).
57. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1994) (exempting labor unions and agricultural
cooperatives from Sherman Act liability); id. §§ 1011-1012 (exempting insurance
where the industry is already subject to state regulation); id. § 2158 (exempting
certain activities which further national defense objectives).
58. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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fees schedule promulgated by the Virginia Bar Association
violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.59 In holding that the
legal profession is not exempt from the Sherman Act, the
Court undermined the rationale behind the opinion in Marjo-
rie Webster. The Court stated:
The nature of an occupation, standing alone, does not
provide sanctuary from the Sherman Act, nor is the
public-service aspect of professional practice controlling in
determining whether § 1 includes professions. Congress
intended to strike as broadly as it could in § 1 of the
Sherman Act, and to read into it so wide an exemption as
that urged on us would be at odds with that purpose.
The language of § 1 of the Sherman Act, of course, con-
tains no exception .... And our cases have repeatedly
established that there is a heavy presumption against
implicit exemptions.6 °
The Supreme Court declined to hold that learned professions
should be treated like any other businesses, however, and
placed a caveat on the application of the Sherman Act to
professions that have a public service aspect. In footnote 17 of
the opinion, often quoted by members of learned professions,
the Court stated:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as
distinguished from a business is, of course, relevant in
determining whether that particular restraint violates the
Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to view the practice
of professions as interchangeable with other business ac-
tivities, and automatically to apply to the professions
antitrust concepts which originated in other areas. The
public service aspect, and other features of the professions,
may require that a particular practice, which could proper-
ly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another
context, be treated differently.6'
Although the caveat in Goldfarb may seem to provide a
glimmer of life in the learned profession exception, the
59. Id.
60. Id. at 787 (citations omitted).
61. Id. at 788 n.17.
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Supreme Court has consistently applied the Sherman Act to
both learned professions and professional organizations post-
Goldfarb. In National Society of Professional Engineers v.
United States,62 the Court applied the Sherman Act to an
engineers' organization that prohibited its members from
bargaining with a customer over price until the customer
selected a specific engineer for the job.63 The Society relied
heavily 64 on footnote 17 of Goldfarb6 5 and argued that unfet-
tered competition among engineers would lead to poor quality
work and public safety hazards.66 The Court, however, refused
to exempt the engineers based on a public safety concern,
calling such justification "a frontal assault on the basic policy
of the Sherman Act."6 7 The Court explained that the Sherman
Act "reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately competition
will produce not only lower prices, but also better goods and
services."6"
A few years later, the Supreme Court went even further
than Goldfarb or Engineers by applying the per se rule to a
professional organization of doctors. In Arizona v. Maricopa
County Medical Society,69 the Maricopa County Medical So-
ciety established a schedule of maximum fees that would be
charged to policyholders of certain insurance plans. 70 The
Court held that the fee schedule constituted price fixing and
was per se illegal. 7' Although the Court had stated in Goldfarb
and Engineers that the existence of a public service aspect of
a learned profession justified the use of a rule of reason analy-
sis, the Court noted in Maricopa that no possible public
service justification existed for price fixing.72 The Court held
that the mere fact that the price fixing was among members
of a profession would not prevent application of the per se
rule.73 Maricopa, therefore, strongly suggests that a profession
62. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
63. Id. at 682-83.
64. Id. at 687.
65. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 778 n.17.
66. Engineers, 435 U.S. at 693.
67. Id. at 695.
68. Id.
69. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
70. Id. at 337.
71. Id. at 348.
72. Id. at 348-49.
73. Id. at 348.
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needs to show a link between a public service goal and the
challenged restraint in order to change the application of the
Sherman Act.
The Supreme Court continued this approach in Federal
Trade Commission v. Indiana Federation of Dentists.4 In
Dentists, the Court applied a "quick look" or "truncated" rule
of reason analysis to an organization of dentists that refused
to submit x-rays to claims examiners.75 Because of the den-
tists' professional status, the Court declined to apply the per
se ban on boycotts. 76 Nevertheless, the Court held that finding
a violation under the rule of reason was "not a matter of any
great difficulty" 77 because the boycott was plainly anti-
competitive. 78 Absent a showing of procompetitive effects by
the professional organization, a "naked" restraint, such as a
boycott, would constitute a section 1 violation under a rule of
reason analysis.79
For the purposes of the ABA's accreditation activities,
however, perhaps the most relevant precedent comes from
United States v. Brown University.80 In this case, the DOJ
challenged the financial aid practices of the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT) and eight Ivy League colleges.8 '
Specifically, the DOJ claimed that the schools' practice of
jointly determining the amount of financial aid awarded to
each student constituted price fixing.82
74. 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
75. See id. at 455.
76. Id. at 458-59.
77. Id. at 459.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 460. The Supreme Court most recently applied the Sherman Act to a
professional organization in Federal Trade Commission v. Superior Court Trial
Lawyers Association, 493 U.S. 411 (1990). In this case, the Court held that a strike
by trial lawyers aimed at raising the fees paid to court-appointed attorneys was a per
se violation. Id. at 436. The Court quickly dismissed the respondents' public service
argument-that the "boycott was adequately justified by the public interest in
obtaining better legal representation for indigent defendants"-stating simply that
the lawyers' proffered social justifications did not make the restraint any less
unlawful. Id. at 419, 424.
80. 805 F. Supp. 288 (E.D. Pa. 1992), rev'd, 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993).
81. Id. at 289.
82. Id. For a discussion of the Brown University case, see generally Donald R.
Carlson & George Bobrinskey Shepard, Cartel on Campus: The Economics and Law
of Academic Institutions' Financial Aid Price-Fixing, 71 OR. L. REV. 563 (1992) and
Stephan D. Browning, Note, The Misguided Application of the Sherman Act to
Colleges and Universities in the Context of Sharing Financial Aid Information, 33
B.C. L. REV. 763 (1992).
FALL 1995-WINTER 19961
MIT, the only school that did not enter into a consent decree
with the DOJ,83 claimed that it was not engaged in "trade or
commerce" within the meaning of the Sherman Act because it
was an educational institution.84 MIT relied heavily on Marjo-
rie Webster.85 The district court, however, had little trouble
dismissing this argument, noting that Goldfarb and its pro-
geny seriously questioned the validity of Marjorie Webster. The
district court stated:
Since Goldfarb, the Supreme Court has continually
brought within the purview of the Sherman Act restraints
involving traditionally "nonbusiness" areas ....
The court fails to see why the rationale of Goldfarb and
its progeny with respect to learned professions should not
apply with equal force to the field of education .... [Tihe
court cannot ignore Goldfarb's admonition that profession-
wide exemptions should be granted warily.
86
Once the court successfully sidestepped Marjorie Webster, it
easily found that MIT was engaged in commerce. The court
noted that MIT had a billion dollar budget, with annual
revenues from tuition, room, and board of approximately $200
million.87 The court concluded, "MIT provides educational
services to its students, for which they pay significant sums of
money. The exchange of money for services is '"commerce" in
the most common usage of that word.' ,,8
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit re-
versed the district court's decision.89 The court's reversal,
however, was not based on a belief that education falls outside
the bounds of commerce. Rather, the court of appeals reversed
because it determined that the district court incorrectly ap-
plied the "quick look" or "truncated" rule of reason analysis.9"
The court of appeals ordered the district court on remand to
undertake a full rule of reason analysis and to consider the
social welfare aspects of the universities' "need-blind admis-
sions" policies.
91
83. Brown University, 805 F. Supp. at 289.
84. Id. at 296. Specifically, MIT argued that the institutions' financial aid
scheme "solely implicated non-commercial aspects of higher education." Id.
85. Id. at 297.
86. Id. at 298.
87. Id.
88. Id. (quoting Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 787-88).
89. United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993).
90. Id. at 678.
91. Id. at 678-79.
ABA Accreditation
648 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reforn [VOL. 29:1&2
Most importantly, the court of appeals expressly held that
the Sherman Act does apply to education. The court stated
that "[tihe exchange of money for services, even by a nonprof-
it organization, is a quintessential commercial transaction.
Therefore, the payment of tuition in return for educational
services constitutes commerce."92
Notably, the court of appeals did not adopt the district
court's argument that Goldfarb and its progeny eclipsed
Marjorie Webster. To the contrary, the court of appeals at-
tempted to reconcile its opinion with Marjorie Webster. The
court stated that Marjorie Webster had held correctly that the
Sherman Act does not apply to the "noncommercial aspects of
the liberal arts."9 3 The court then distinguished the situation
in Brown University, determining that the challenged prac-
tice-the setting of tuition-clearly was commercial.94
Unfortunately, by attempting to reconcile its opinion with
Marjorie Webster, the court of appeals created the potential
for confusion. The assertion that the Sherman Act does not
apply to "noncommercial aspects" of education provides no
guidance for determining which activities of an educational
institution are commercial and which are noncommercial. By
resuscitating Marjorie Webster, the court of appeals has al-
lowed a shadow of doubt to remain on the applicability of the
Sherman Act to education.
Finally, any qualms that the Brown University court or the
Marjorie Webster court had in applying the Sherman Act to
liberal arts education should not discourage a court from
applying the Sherman Act to legal education. Legal education
is much more like a traditional economic good than is a typi-
cal liberal arts education. That is, legal education is an
investment in human capital through which the purchaser
forgoes present income in hopes of increased future earn-
ings." Although one may pursue a liberal arts education for
noneconomic reasons, few students enter law school on an
esoteric quest for knowledge. Rather, for most students law
school is a necessary step to entering the legal profession.96
92. Id. at 666 (citation omitted).
93. Id. at 667.
94. Id. at 667-68.
95. See generally GARY BECKER, HuMAN CAPITAL (1961) (discussing education
as an investment in human capital).
96. Several studies have shown a very strong correlation between law school
applications and perceived earnings of lawyers. Richard B. Freeman, Legal
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B. Implicit Immunity
Despite Goldfarb's admonition against implicit exemptions
from the Sherman Act,97 some commentators have argued
that the Higher Education Act of 196398 (HEA) implicitly
exempts accreditation activities which the Department of
Education approves.99 Under the HEA, the Department of
Education requires that educational institutions be approved
by an established accrediting agency in order to be eligible
for federal programs. i 0 Because the Department of Education
promulgates standards for the approval of accrediting agen-
cies'' and because the ABA has been approved as an accred-
iting agency under these regulations, some commentators
argue that activities that are approved by one branch of the
government should not be prosecuted by another."0 2 Thus, to
avoid such inconsistency, Congress must have repealed im-
plicitly the antitrust laws for accrediting institutions, such as
the ABA, l0 3 which have been approved by the Department of
Education.
This argument, however, overstates the potential conflict
between approval by the Department of Education and ille-
gality under the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court has held
that regulation of an industry by an arm of the Executive
Branch will not implicitly immunize the industry from anti-
trust liability unless the immunization is "necessary to make
the [conflicting regulation] work, and even then only to the
minimum extent necessary. "' 4
'Cobwebs": A Recursive Model of the Market for New Lawyers, 57 REV. ECON. &
STAT. 171, 175-77 (1975); Sherwin Rosen, The Market for Lawyers, 35 J.L. & ECON.
215, 238-45 (1992).
97. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975).
98. 20 U.S.C. § 1099b(a)(3) (1994).
99. See, e.g., 60 Fed. Reg. 63,766, 63,770 (1995) (summarizing the comments of
four accrediting agencies).
100. See 20 U.S.C. § 1088(a)-(b) (1994).
101. See id. § 1099b.
102. See supra note 99.
103. See MSL's REPLY REGARDING TERMINATION OF THE ABA'S ACCREDITATION
STATUS 1 [hereinafter MSL's REPLY) (seeking to terminate the ABA's status as an
approved accrediting agency).
104. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 US. 341, 357 (1963).
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For example, in National Gerimedical Hospital v. Blue
Cross,0 5 a hospital sued Blue Cross under the Sherman Act
after Blue Cross refused to accept the hospital as a partici-
pating member. Blue Cross claimed that it based its refusal
on the recommendation of a private, nonprofit corporation
funded by the National Health Planning and Resource Devel-
opment Act of 1974106 (NHPRDA).107 The organization had
found that a surplus of beds existed in the nearby area and
had recommended against building new hospitals.'0 8 Blue
Cross argued that because its action aided in implementing
the recommendations of a congressionally created agency, its
actions were immune from antitrust scrutiny. 10 9
The Court, however, held that the NHPRDA did not implic-
itly repeal the antitrust laws. The Court wrote:
"Implied antitrust immunity is not favored, and can be
justified only by a convincing showing of clear repugnancy
between the antitrust laws and the regulatory sys-
tem." . . .
... Even when an industry is regulated substantially,
this does not necessarily evidence an intent to repeal the
antitrust laws with respect to every action taken within
the industry. Intent to repeal the antitrust laws is much
clearer when a regulatory agency has been empowered to
authorize or require the type of conduct under antitrust
challenge."'
Because Blue Cross was not required to shun National Ger-
imedical Hospital under the NHPRDA, but rather undertook
its action voluntarily in response to an advisory opinion, the
Court held that Blue Cross' activities were not exempt from
the Sherman Act."'
105. 452 U.S. 378 (1981).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 3001 (1994).
107. Gerimedical, 452 U.S. at 381-82.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 388.
110. Id. at 388-89 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting United States v.
National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 719-20 (1975)).
111. Id. at 389-90. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that regulatory over-
sight has implicitly repealed the Sherman Act in only a few cases. Such cases
involved situations in which an agency directly sanctioned a restraint on trade. See,
e.g., United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 730-35
(1974) (holding that certain restrictions on the sale of mutual funds were implicitly
immunized from antitrust immunity by the Maloney and Investment Company
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The provisions of the HEA that allow the Secretary of
Education to approve certain accrediting institutions do not
meet the "clear repugnancy" test of Gerimedical. The HEA
merely requires that accrediting agencies have voluntary
memberships and have the principal purpose of accrediting
institutions of higher education. 112 Neither requirement di-
rectly conflicts with the Sherman Act. Rather, certain provi-
sions within the HEA show that Congress probably did not
want the HEA to repeal implicitly the antitrust laws. The
HEA requires that accrediting institutions be financially and
administratively "separate and independent" from any affili-
ated trade association.'13 This requirement indicates that
Congress apparently recognized the possibility that an indus-
try could use accreditation for anticompetitive purposes. This
apparent concern, along with the lack of any direct conflict
between the HEA and the Sherman Act, negates any argu-
ment that approval by the Department of Education immu-
nizes the ABA from antitrust liability.
C. The State Action Doctrine
In defending future accreditation standards, the ABA may
claim that it is immune from antitrust liability under the
"state action" doctrine. The state action doctrine stems from
the Supreme Court's decision in Parker v. Brown,"4 which
held that anticompetitive conduct undertaken pursuant to a
mandate from state law is immune from federal antitrust
liability. In Parker, a raisin producer sought to enjoin en-
forcement of California's Agricultural Prorate Act." 5 The
California Act was intended to "conserve the agricultural
Acts); Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659, 682-91 (1974) (holding that
fixing commission rates by the Securities Exchange Commission did not violate the
Sherman Act because the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 allowed the exchange to
approve or disapprove rates). For a general discussion of implied repeal of the
Sherman Act through regulatory oversight, see G.E. Hale & Rosemary D. Hale,
Competition or Control VI: Application of Antitrust Laws to Regulated Industries,
111 U. PA. L. REV. 46 (1962).
112. 20 U.S.C. § 1099b(a) (1994).
113. Id. § 1099b(a)-(b).
114. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
115. Id. at 344.
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wealth of the state"' 16 by stabilizing the price of raisins and
restricting output."7 Although the Court assumed that such a
restraint on trade would violate the Sherman Act if under-
taken by private actors, the Court, relying on the principles
of federalism, held that Congress did not intend the Sherman
Act to apply to state actors. 18
The ABA could argue that any restraints on trade which
the accreditation standards impose result from state action,
because forty-five states require that an applicant to the bar
be a graduate of an ABA-accredited law school." 9 The ABA,
therefore, may argue that the accreditation standards stem
from a state mandate.
20
Such an argument should fail. The Supreme Court dealt
with a very similar argument in Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar.12' The lawyers in Goldfarb argued that because the Su-
preme Court of Virginia authorized county bar associations to
establish ethical codes, the establishment of a minimum fee
schedule constituted state action. 122 The Supreme Court,
however, found that the minimum fee schedule was essential-
ly private anticompetitive activity masquerading as state
action. The Court stated:
[Ilt cannot fairly be said that the State of Virginia
through its Supreme Court Rules required the anti-
competitive activities of either respondent.... [Allthough
the Supreme Court's ethical codes mention advisory fee
schedules they do not direct either respondent to supply
them .... It is not enough that, as the County Bar puts
it, anticompetitive conduct is "prompted" by state action;
rather, anticompetitive activities must be compelled by
direction of the State acting as a sovereign.
123
116. Id. at 346 (quoting the California Agricultural Prorate Act, 1933 Cal. Stat.
754).
117. Id. at 348.
118. Id. at 350-51.
119. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
120. At least one law school dean has advanced this argument. See Ken Myers,
Dean Comes Out Swinging and Defends Accreditation ABA-Style, NAT'L L.J., Jan.
22, 1996, at A15.
121. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
122. Id. at 790-91.
123. Id.
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The reasoning in Goldfarb is directly applicable to the ABA
accreditation and antitrust issue. Although states have au-
thorized the ABA to accredit law schools, the ABA cannot
argue that the states have authorized it to issue specific
accreditation standards that restrain trade.
The Supreme Court has further limited the state action
doctrine since Parker. In California Retail Liquor Dealers
Ass'n v. Midcal,24 the Court held that no state action immu-
nity could exist without both adequate supervision by the
state and a clear mandate from the state to displace competi-
tion.125 The ABA accreditation process would fail on both
counts. Although most states rely on ABA accreditation deci-
sions, no state actively supervises the adoption of ABA
accreditation standards or the accreditation process. In fact,
state legislatures have no input on accreditation standards;
the ABA House of Delegates alone approves the standards. 26
Further, no state has articulated a clear mandate to displace
competition by requiring bar applicants to be graduates of
ABA-approved schools.
In sum, Goldfarb and its progeny show that the ABA is not
exempt from the Sherman Act by virtue of its status as a
nonprofit organization of professionals. Furthermore, Gold-
farb, juxtaposed with United States v. Brown University,
127
show that no blanket exemption exists for legal education.
Rather, the market for legal education is a type of market
that the Sherman Act is intended to govern. Also, regulation
by the Department of Education does not implicitly immunize
the ABA's accreditation activities, nor does the state action
doctrine protect the ABA.
III. APPLICATION OF SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT
TO LAW SCHOOL ACCREDITATION
A. "Per Se" Versus "Rule of Reason" Analysis
If the accreditation activities of the ABA are subject to the
Sherman Act, one may wonder if it is possible to have any
124. 445 US. 97 (1980).
125. Id. at 102-06.
126. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 5, at i.
127. 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993).
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accreditation standards for law schools. After all, accredita-
tion is a barrier to entry-a means of preventing some par-
ties from competing in the market for legal education. Early
in the history of the Sherman Act, however, the Supreme
Court held that the Sherman Act does not prohibit all re-
straints on trade. 2 ' Because all contracts restrain trade to
some extent,129 the Court held that the Sherman Act focused
only on "unreasonable" restraints on trade.' The Supreme
Court has further held that some restraints on trade are so
patently harmful to competition that they are per se illegal.
Yet, the Court has been hesitant to extend application of the
per se rule. Generally, the rule only applies in cases of price
fixing, output restrictions, horizontal market allocation, and
boycotts aimed at a competitor.'
3'
Although ABA accreditation affects the price of legal educa-
tion, 132 restricts output,133 and could be characterized as a
boycott of non-ABA-accredited schools, 3  the per se rule
should not apply to a review of accreditation standards for
two reasons.
First, the ABA accreditation committee is essentially a
joint venture among members of the ABA. That is, the mem-
bers of the ABA joined together to create a new product: the
ABA "seal of approval." ABA accreditation signals to poten-
tial consumers that a law school and its graduates have met
ABA standards. By placing its seal of approval on a law
school, the ABA essentially warrants the quality of a school,
much like Good Housekeeping or the Underwriters Laborato-
ry signal quality by placing their seals of approval on certain
products.
128. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60, 64-65 (1911).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See supra Part I.
132. See Open Letter to Deans, supra note 11, at 49 (complaining that accredita-
tion compliance is "terribly costly").
133. The difficulty of meeting accreditation standards has discouraged the cre-
ation of many law schools. See Harry First, Competition in the Legal Education
Industry (II): An Antitrust Analysis, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1049, 1074 (1979) (discussing
eight universities which studied the feasibility of opening law schools and were
deterred).
134. The accreditation system could be characterized as a boycott of unaccredit-
ed schools. Id. at 1099-101; Antitrust Opinion Letter Issued by Weil, Gotshal &
Manges, MSL L. REV., Winter 1994, at 26, 44-45. Cf Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (holding that the Associated Press-a collection of inde-
pendent newspapers which agreed to share news stories-was an illegal boycott
since it refused to deal with newspapers which were not part of the cooperative).
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In recent years, the Supreme Court has consistently held
that the rule of reason, rather than the per se rule, applies to
judgments regarding joint ventures. In Broadcast Music, Inc.
v. Columbia Broadcasting System,'35 the Supreme Court held
that courts should not apply the per se rule to restrictions
that are necessary to create a product. 136 Broadcast Music,
Inc. (BMI) was a nonprofit corporation which was affiliated
with or represented nearly 20,000 composers and authors for
the purpose of selling and policing the copyrights of artistic
works.'37 BMI sold blanket licenses to television and radio
stations, and under these licenses the broadcaster had rights
to unlimited use of works covered by the license.138 Although
the blanket license was the result of a horizontal agreement
between competitors who fixed a price, the Court noted that
the blanket license had redeeming procompetitive qualities.
The blanket license reduced the transaction costs between
artist and broadcaster and also reduced the cost of policing
the use of the copyright.'39 Without some horizontal restric-
tion, the Court noted, the blanket license product would not
exist.
140
Similarly, in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of
Oklahoma,'4 ' the Supreme Court noted that restraints neces-
sary to create a product were not unreasonable per se and,
therefore, should be evaluated under the rule of reason.'42 In
NCAA, the University of Oklahoma and the University of
Georgia challenged an NCAA rule that limited the number of
times a university's football team could appear on television
in a season. 143 The Court noted that "what is critical is that
this case involves an industry in which horizontal restraints
on competition are essential if the product is to be available
at all."'44 Without an agreement on the basic rules, the prod-
uct of college athletics could not exist.
145
135. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
136. Id. at 16-24.
137. Id. at 5.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 20-21.
140. Id. at 21.
141. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
142. Id. at 100-04.
143. Id. at 88.
144. Id. at 101.
145. Applying the rule of reason, the Court held that the NCAA's restrictions on
televising games violated the Sherman Act. Id. at 120.
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Second, the ABA's accreditation activities should be judged
under the rule of reason because of the public service aspect
of law school accreditation. Footnote 17 of Goldfarb v. Virgin-
ia State Bar suggests that although a learned profession is
not exempt from antitrust scrutiny, the presence of a public
service component in a given profession may soften a court's
approach.'46 After Goldfarb, the Supreme Court has usually
applied the rule of reason, not the per se rule, to professional
organizations.
47
In the case of accreditation, the ABA potentially serves the
public interest by protecting primary consumers from infor-
mational asymmetries. The market for legal services is one in
which the general public is ill-equipped to make judgments
about quality.'48 The average person would have to incur a
large opportunity cost in order to educate herself so that she
adequately could judge the quality of legal services.'49
Enforcing minimum quality standards through accredita-
tion, however, eliminates some of the information asymme-
try. 50 A consumer who chooses legal services from a graduate
of an accredited law school ostensibly guarantees himself a
certain level of competence, thereby eliminating some of the
costs of searching for quality legal services. 5' The elimina-
tion of possible information asymmetries, if found to exist,
would be an important procompetitive factor in a rule of
reason analysis.
B. The Enjoined Standards
Even taking into account the informational asymmetries of
the legal market in a rule of reason analysis, several of the
ABA's accreditation standards most likely would not survive
146. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788 n.17 (1975). See also
supra note 61 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 74-90 and accompanying text.
148. See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons".• Quality Uncer-
tainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (arguing that licensing
reduces consumer uncertainty, thereby preventing overall market quality from
dropping).
149. See Hayne E. Leland, Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Mini-




antitrust scrutiny. Many of the standards seem to have no
other purpose than to benefit the faculties of law schools or
the law schools themselves, and cannot fairly be character-
ized as minimum quality standards. Rather, the standards
increase the price of legal education, restrict output, and
potentially enforce monopolies in other markets. The consent
decree enjoins the enforcement of standards governing faculty
salaries, the transfer of credits from unaccredited schools,
and the prohibition against proprietary law schools. 152 This
section reviews the enjoined standards and analyzes the
antitrust liability of each standard.
1. Standard 405: Faculty Salaries-ABA Accreditation
Standard 405 requires, in part:
The law school shall establish and maintain conditions
adequate to attract and retain a competent faculty.
(a) The compensation paid faculty members should be
sufficient to attract and retain persons of high ability and
should be reasonably related to the prevailing compensa-
tion of comparably qualified private practitioners and gov-
ernment attorneys and of the judiciary. The compensation
paid faculty members at a school seeking approval should
be comparable with that paid faculty members at similar
approved law schools in the same general geographical
area. 1
53
This standard comes perilously close to price fixing. The
standard could ostensibly prevent a school from attempting
to undercut a competitor's price by paying lower faculty sala-
ries. The ABA's interpretations of the standard support this
price-fixing characterization. Interpretation 1 of Standard
405(a) states:
A law school's faculty salaries, especially of full and asso-
ciate professors, which remain unfavorable in comparison
with the national median and with faculty salaries at
approved law schools in the same geographical area may
not be sufficient to attract and maintain a competent
faculty.'54
152. See 60 Fed. Reg. 39,422 (1995).
153. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 5, Standard 405 (emphasis added).
154. Id. Interpretation 1 of Standard 405(a).
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Thus, the interpretation suggests that any school that tries to
undercut the market for law faculty by paying less than the
national or geographic means runs the risk of the ABA find-
ing its faculty incompetent and therefore in noncompliance
with the standard.
Further, Interpretation 2 of Standard 405(a) states that
"[a] faculty salary structure which ranks at the very bottom
of salaries at ABA-approved law schools is ... presumptively
in noncompliance with the Standards."'55 Interpretation 2 can
easily be seen as a means of putting upward pressure on
faculty salaries. Under this interpretation, no school can
afford to remain continually at the low end of faculty sala-
ries. Although the range in faculty salaries among law
schools is substantial, 5 ' anecdotal evidence shows that the
ABA vigorously reviews faculty salaries during accreditation
inspections.'57
Although the ABA states that Standard 405 is necessary to
"establish and maintain conditions adequate to attract and
retain a competent faculty," s58 this justification would not
save the standard under a rule of reason analysis. Such a
rationale is very similar to that which the Supreme Court
rejected in National Society of Professional Engineers v.
United States.'59 In Engineers, the Society argued that supra-
competitive pricing for engineering services was necessary to
protect the public from low-quality work. 60 The Court re-
jected the argument that high price was tied to high quality,
155. Id. Interpretation 2 of Standard 405(a).
156. A 1994 survey of 176 law schools shows a median salary of $61,792 for an
assistant professor, with the range extending from $46,350 (University of Akron) to
$79,200 (Brooklyn Law School). What Lawyers Earn: Professors and Deans, NAT'L
L.J., Aug. 1994, at 30 (Career Issue). For full professors, the median was $102,986
with a range from $65,935 (University of Akron) to $127,500 (University of Michi-
gan). Id. For deans, the median was $135,925 with a range of $118,000 (Humphreys
School of Law) to $184,680 (University of Texas). Id.
157. MSL's REPLY, supra note 103, at 22 (citing a complaint by the ABA to the
dean of Cooley Law School that a salary of $100,000 was too low for twelve months
of work). Salaries at some schools have risen dramatically in recent years. See Ken
Myers, Law Profs: Poor No More, Pay Is Up-Some Academic Salaries Have In-
creased 50 Percent. Is It Too Much?, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 18, 1993, at Al, A50; see also
Steven R. Smith, Accreditation Revisited: A Reexamination of ABA Approved Law
Schools, 27 WAYNE L. REV. 95, 105 (1980) (stating that the author, an accreditation
official, believes that accreditation is used to further faculty interests including the
promotion of reasonable compensation).
158. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 5, Standard 405.
159. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
160. Id. at 684-85.
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stating that such an argument was "nothing less than a
frontal assault on the basic policy of the Sherman Act."'' The
same rationale that was applied to Engineers also should
apply to legal educators.
Although a school could request a variance from Standard
405 and potentially rebut a presumption of noncompliance,
the possibility of a variance most likely would not save this
Standard under a rule of reason analysis. In fact, Inter-
pretation 2 of Standard 405(a), which states that very low
faculty salaries are presumptively in noncompliance, 16 2 is
very similar to the minimum fee schedule challenged in
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar.163 In Goldfarb, the Virginia
State Bar did not require adherence to the minimum fee
schedule, but stated that "'evidence that an attorney habi-
tually charges less than the suggested minimum fee schedule
... raises a presumption that such lawyer is guilty of
misconduct.' ,164 As with Goldfarb, the possibility of a vari-
ance from this price control would not ameliorate the
antitrust violation.
2. Standard 305: Transfers from Unaccredited Law
Schools-Interpretation 3 of Standard 305 states, "Transfer
credit may be granted only for work taken at another ABA
approved law school. Transfer credit may not be given for
work taken at a school before it receives ABA approval.' 65
This Standard may constitute an illegal boycott of unaccred-
ited law schools. That is, because accredited schools cannot
accept transfer credits from unaccredited schools, and be-
cause graduates of unaccredited schools are not allowed to sit
for the bar in most states, unaccredited schools are essen-
tially forced out of the market.
The Supreme Court has held that horizontal boycotts-
boycotts in which a group of actors coerce a third party not to
deal with a competitor-are per se illegal. 66 In the case of
ABA accreditation, accredited schools, acting through the
ABA, could be characterized as prohibiting member schools
from dealing with nonmember schools.
161. Id. at 695.
162. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 5, Interpretation 2 of Standard 405(a).
163. 421 US. 773 (1975).
164. Id. at 777-78 (quoting Virginia State Bar Comm. on Legal Ethics, Opinion
No. 98 (June 1, 1960) and No. 170 (May 28, 1971)).
165. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 5, Interpretation 3 of Standard 305.
166. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
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In the case of accreditation, of course, some exclusion is
necessary in order for accreditation to serve its purpose. If all
schools received accreditation as a matter of right, accredita-
tion would lose its value as a signal for quality. Also, if no
restrictions were placed on transfers from unaccredited
schools, accreditation would lose much of its value, because a
student potentially would be able to graduate from an accred-
ited school after receiving most of his education at an unac-
credited school. For this reason, the consent decree only
requires the ABA to allow member schools to accept credits
from schools approved by their states and permits the ABA to
require that two-thirds of all credits come from an ABA-
accredited school.'67 Thus, the decree balances the anticom-
petitive effects of the restriction against the procompetitive
effects of accreditation as a signal for quality.
3. Prohibition on Proprietary Law Schools-Standard 202
requires that law schools be nonprofit institutions. 68 In 1977,
however, the ABA announced that it would consider applica-
tions for accreditation from proprietary schools that other-
wise meet the ABA Standards. 69 Despite this change in
policy, the ABA has been reluctant to accredit a proprietary
law school. 70
Like the restriction on accepting credits from unaccredited
schools, Standard 202 may be an illegal boycott. In this case,
however, the argument that the ABA needs to exclude inferi-
or schools is undermined by the ABA's own finding that pro-
prietary schools are not necessarily inferior to nonprofit
schools.' 7 ' Including proprietary schools, therefore, will not
necessarily decrease the value of accreditation as a signal for
quality.
167. 60 Fed. Reg. 39,421, 39,422 (1995).
168. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 5, Standard 202.
169. Id. Interpretation of Standard 202.
170. For example, Western State University College of Law, a large proprietary
school in California, has been seeking accreditation for two decades. Compare First,
supra note 133, at 1082-86 (detailing Western's accreditation efforts during the late
1970s) with Ken Myers, Calif. School Says New ABA Plan Gives Accredit Where It Is
Due, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 14, 1995, at A15 (discussing Western's current optimism with
respect to gaining ABA accreditation under the new consent decree).
171. Donna Fossum, Law School Accreditation Standards and the Structure of
American Legal Education, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 515, 540.
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C. Standards Under Review
In addition to enjoining the enforcement of the standards
on faculty compensation, transfer credits, and proprietary
law schools, the consent decree requires the ABA to review
standards in six other areas: limits on teaching hours, stu-
dent/faculty ratios, bar review courses, physical facilities,
sabbaticals, and resource allocation. 72 This section analyzes
the antitrust implications for each of the standards and pro-
poses changes to questionable standards.
1. Standard 404: Limits on Teaching Hours-Standard
404 mandates that a faculty member shall not be required to
teach more than
(i) an average of eight scheduled class hours per week,
counting repetitions during the same academic period as
one-half for this purpose, or
(ii) an average of ten scheduled class hours per week,
counting repetitions during the same academic period at
full value.'73
Restricting teaching hours effectively restricts output. Courts
generally deem restrictions on output per se illegal. 74 Be-
cause agreements to restrict output are essentially the same
as agreements to raise prices,175 the impact of Standard 404
is very similar to that of Standard 405. Both standards raise
the effective hourly wage of faculty members.
The ABA could argue that the restriction on the number of
teaching hours ensures that faculty members have adequate
time to prepare for class. This argument, however, is essen-
tially the same as the argument for fixing salaries at a high
rate. The restriction on hours taught can serve only to ele-
vate a professor's hourly wage above the market rate. Any
quality justification for holding down output should therefore
172. 60 Fed. Reg. 39,423 (1995).
173. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 5, Standard 404.
174. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
175. Cf SAMUELSON, supra note 10, at 52-58 (discussing the inverse relationship
between output and price).
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be treated the same as a quality justification for holding up
price. Such a justification should be rejected under Engi-
neers. 
176
Because the restriction in hours elevates a professor's hour-
ly wage above the market rate, the ABA should eliminate
Standard 404 and allow the market to determine the number
of teaching hours. If the ABA wishes to ensure that profes-
sors are adequately prepared for class, it should modify Stan-
dard 404 to require that professors spend at least one hour
preparing for each hour taught. Such a standard would do
more to ensure the quality of instruction than a standard
that merely limits the number of hours taught. After all, the
current version of Standard 404 does not require professors
to spend any of their excess time preparing for class.
177
2. Standards 201 and 401-405: Student/Faculty Ratios-
The Interpretation of Standards 201 and 401-405 states that
a law school that has a student/faculty ratio of greater than
30:1 is presumptively in noncompliance with the standards,
while a school that has a student/faculty ratio of less than
20:1 is presumptively in compliance. 171 In computing the
faculty component of the student/faculty ratio, the ABA in-
cludes only full-time tenure track teachers who do not have
administrative duties. 17' Thus, the ABA does not count ad-
juncts, professors emeriti, or administrators who also teach.
The consent decree does not require the ABA to review its
student/faculty ratio; rather, it only requires the ABA to
review its calculation of the faculty component of the ratio.
By excluding adjuncts, professors emeriti, and administra-
tors, the ABA increases a school's student/faculty ratio. Thus,
in order to remain in compliance with the standards, a law
school must hire more faculty. There are two problems with
this requirement.
First, although the ABA states that the purpose of the stu-
dent/faculty ratio is to reduce class size and increase student
176. See supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
177. Although a standard which requires professors to spend an hour preparing
for each hour taught would almost certainly reduce the amount of time available for
research, this should be of no concern to the ABA. The point of ABA accreditation
should be to ensure that law schools are producing competent lawyers, not volumes
of scholarship.
178. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 5, Interpretation of Standards 201, 401-405.
179. Id.
FALL 1995-WINTER 1996]
contact with faculty,80 neither the means of calculating the
ratio nor the ratios themselves further this goal. If the pur-
pose of the standards is to promote small classes, the ABA
should not exclude adjuncts, emeriti, and administrators
from the calculation of the ratio. Presumably, the addition of
a class taught by an adjunct would reduce average class size
as much as the addition of a class taught by a tenure-track
professor. Likewise, there is no reason to believe that a pro-
fessor emeritus would be less receptive to student comments
than a tenure-track professor.
Second, a student/faculty ratio by itself does nothing to
reduce class size, because such a ratio does not require facul-
ty to teach. Many schools boast a low student/faculty ratio,
yet maintain a high average class size. 18' The ABA states
that classes of fewer than thirty students have "special val-
ue."" 2 If the purpose of the standards is to promote such
classes, the ABA should, at a minimum, interpret Standards
201 and 401-405 to require that the average class size be
less than thirty. In addition, if the ABA wishes to increase
student contact with faculty, the ABA should interpret
Standards 201 and 401-405 as imposing a minimum on the
number of hours that faculty are available. Such an interpre-
tation would do more to increase faculty accessibility than
would imposing a twenty-to-one student/faculty ratio.
3. Standards 301, 302, and 503: Bar Review Courses and
the LSAT-Standards 301 and 302(b) prohibit a law school
from offering credit for a bar review course.'83 The ABA offers
no justification for this requirement. Indeed, the ABA may
have a conflict of interest because an owner of a major bar
review course sits on the ABA accreditation committee.8 4
180. Id. ("Legal educators have traditionally found special value in classes of
fewer than 30 students each.").
181. The University of Michigan Law School, for example, has approximately
1060 students and 58 faculty members who are not adjuncts, emeriti, or administra-
tors. Thus, the law school has a student/faculty ratio of approximately 18 to 1.
Telephone Interview with Rayburn Howland, Assistant to the Dean of the Universi-
ty of Michigan Law School (Mar. 28, 1996) (based on data provided by the law
school to the ABA for winter of 1996). Yet students spend most of their time in
classes of more than eighty students. Telephone Interview with Trent Taylor,
Student at the University of Michigan Law School (Apr. 4, 1996).
182. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 5, Interpretation of Standards 201, 401-405.
183. Id. Standard 302(b) and Interpretation of Standard 301.
184. Professor Frederick Hart of the University of New Mexico Law School is a
member of the ABA accreditation committee. See infra note 186. Professor Hart is
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This prohibition could easily qualify as an unreasonable
restraint on trade. By preventing law schools from offering
for-credit bar review courses, commercial bar reviews fore-
close a major and natural source of competition.
Although not addressed in the consent decree, a similar con-
flict of interest exists between the ABA and the Law School
Admissions Council (LSAC), which administers the Law
School Admissions Test (LSAT). Standard 503 requires that
law schools either use the LSAT or another "acceptable test"
as part of their admissions criteria. To date, all accredited law
schools use the LSAT.
185
Although use of a standardized admissions test, in and of
itself, does not violate the Sherman Act, the placement of
some directors of the LSAC on the ABA accreditation commit-
tee and site inspection teams 186 may raise an antitrust prob-
lem. Given that the LSAC collects revenues of over forty
million dollars from administering the LSAT187 and has
posted profits as high as fourteen million dollars,'88 the LSAC
clearly has an interest in maintaining the LSAT monopoly
and preventing an alternative test from being used.
Standard 503 could be characterized as an illegal tying
contract under section 1 of the Sherman Act. A tying contract
requires the buyer of one good to purchase another good that
also a co-owner of SMH Bar Review. Complaint, supra note 7, at 5, reprinted in
MSL L. REV., Winter 1994, at 6.
185. See MSL's REPLY, supra note 103, at 108.
186. Professor Hart is a long-time member of both the Board of Directors and
the Board of Trustees of the Law School Admissions Council (LSAC). 1990-1991
LAw SCHOOL ADMISSIONS COUNCIL ANNUAL REPORT 35-36 [hereinafter LSAC
ANNUAL REPORT]. He is also a member of the ABA's Accreditation Committee.
1990-1991 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CONSULTANT ON LEGAL EDUCATION TO THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 105 [hereinafter ABA ANNUAL REPORT]. Professor
Claude R. Sowle has served as interim president of the LSAC, 1990-1991 LSAC
ANNUAL REPORT, supra, at 35-36, and on the ABA's Accreditation Committee,
1991-1992 ABA ANNUAL REPORT, supra, at 100. They are the Hart and Sowle of the
interlocking leadership. In addition, Peter A. Winograd, past president of the LSAC,
1988-1989 LSAC ANNUAL REPORT, supra, at 14, allegedly has served on an ABA
site inspection team for at least one law school that does not use the Law School
Admissions Test (LSAT). Complaint, supra note 7, at 7, reprinted in MSL L. REV.,
Winter 1994, at 6.
187. 1990-1991 LSAC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 186, at 30. Most of the
revenue came from LSAT fees, Law School Data Access Service (LSDAS) Fees, and
Student Loan Program Fees. Id.
188. Id. The LSAC historically has been a profitable enterprise. Other than a
$462,000 loss posted in 1983-1984, the LSAC has posted a profit every year since
1983. See 1983-1991 LSAC ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 186.
FALL 1995-WINTER 19961
is distinct from the primary good.' 9 A tying contract is illegal
under section 1 if (1) a tie exists between two separate prod-
ucts; (2) a seller has market power in the market for the
tying product; and (3) a substantial volume of commerce is
affected in the market for the tied product. 190 Under this rule,
Standard 503 most likely is illegal. First, the buyer of a legal
education also must purchase the LSAT. Second, because the
ABA has a monopoly over legal education accreditation, the
ABA definitely has market power in the tying market. Third,
the LSAT involves a substantial volume of commerce in the
market for law school admissions tests.' 9' The fact that the
two goods stem from two nominally separate producers prob-
ably will not defeat a tying claim because some of the sellers
of the tying product, ABA accreditation, have an economic
interest in the tied product, the LSAT.192
In order to prevent the misuse of ABA accreditation by
commercial enterprises, the ABA should prohibit persons who
have a substantial financial stake in either the LSAC or a
commercial bar review course from participating in the
creation or enforcement of accreditation standards. This pro-
hibition would not only alleviate any antitrust concern, but
would also circumvent the need for a debate on the educa-
tional merits of prohibiting for-credit bar review classes or of
requiring the LSAT.
4. Standards 601-603 and 704: Library Requirements-The
consent decree requires the ABA to review its standards on
physical plant requirements. 193 For many law schools, the most
vexing and expensive of these requirements concern the size
and maintenance of an adequate library, 194 as required by
189. POSNER, supra note 29, at 171.
190. LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 434 (1977).
191. See supra notes 187-88 and accompanying text.
192. Cf Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 1977)
(holding that cemeteries that require customers to purchase tombstones through the
cemetery have an economic interest in the tied product because they receive a
commission on the sale). But see Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 680 F.2d
66, 67 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that a local dental association had no economic
interest in its requirement that its members also belong to a national dental
association).
193. 60 Fed. Reg. 39,421, 39,423 (1995).
194. Sarah H. Lee, ABA Standards and Law School Libraries, MSL L. REV., Fall
1994, at 65; see also Gail M. Daly, Law Library Evaluation Standards: How Will We
Evaluate the Virtual Library?, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 61, 65 (1995) (citing studies showing
that library costs account for approximately 18% of the typical law school budget).
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Standards 601,602, and 603.'5 Every library must contain the
materials on the ABA's "Core Collection" list, 19 6 and must
provide access to other materials "reasonably necessary for the
proper conduct of the school's educational and research pro-
grams."197 The ABA has stated that a lack of seating space or
"low salary levels of current library staff"' 98 will violate these
standards.'99 In addition, Standard 704 requires that the library
of a law school with a full-time program be able to seat at least
fifty percent of the student body and that the library of a school
with a part-time program be able to seat at least thirty-five
precent of the student body.2 °0 Anecdotal evidence indicates that
in evaluating law libraries, the ABA focuses primarily on the
size of a collection and not on the ease of access to materials.20 '
Certainly, the adequacy of a law school's library has a direct
impact on the quality of the school's education. The ABA,
however, has been inflexible in applying this standard and has
resisted schools' attempts to adopt low-cost alternatives to
expensive collections.20 2 For example, the ABA requires that
schools have hard-bound copies of materials, even if the
materials are rarely used and are available on-line.20 3 Such a
requirement dramatically increases library costs.20 4 The ABA
standards also have presented an obstacle to law schools that
are located near one another and wish to consolidate collec-
tions.20 5 Such a rigid application of Standards 601, 602, and
603 suggests that the standards are aimed only nominally at
the quality of education and instead are aimed at achieving
uniformity regarding the cost of inputs of legal education. By
achieving uniformity in the cost of inputs, the standards could
be used to prevent price cutting by law schools.20 6
195. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 5, Standards 601-603.
196. Id. Standard 602(a) and Annex II.
197. Id. Standard 602(b).
198. Id. Interpretation 3 of Standard 601.
199. Under the consent decree, the ABA is prohibited from enforcing any require-
ments on the salaries of librarians. 60 Fed. Reg. 39,421, 39,422 (1995).
200. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 5, Standard 704.
201. See Daly, supra note 194, at 69 (citing legal educators who accuse the ABA
of "bean counting").
202. Lee, supra note 194, at 70-71.
203. Id.
204. See Daly, supra note 194, at 67 n.27 (citing a study that shows that the cost
of a subscription to a periodical is 12 times more expensive than the cost of providing
access by electronic means).
205. Ken Myers, S.F Proposal for Library Raises Accreditation Issues, NAT'L L.J.,
Aug. 16, 1993, at A4.
206. See SULLIVAN, supra note 190, at 275-77.
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In order to alleviate these concerns, the ABA should revise
Standards 601, 602, and 603 to focus on the ease of access to
information, instead of the size of the collection. Although the
ABA still should require that each law school possess a core
collection of essential materials, it should also acknowledge
that rarely used materials available on-line or through CD-
ROM should be counted as part of a school's collection. The
ABA also should allow geographically close libraries to consoli-
date collections, provided that each law school has a set of core
materials on-site. Such a requirement would allow students
ready access to important materials, while allowing schools to
decrease expenses by sharing the cost of providing rarely used
materials.
5. Standard 405(b): Sabbaticals-Standard 405(b) requires
that law schools provide faculty with "reasonable oppor-
tunit[ies] for leaves of absence and for scholarly research."2 7
The DOJ alleged that this standard had been used to require
paid sabbaticals, summer stipends, and other research com-
pensation. 8 Although paid sabbaticals are typical of institu-
tions of higher education and may allow professors to develop
new instructional materials, this standard could also be
characterized as a means of salary augmentation. That is, by
requiring paid leaves of absence, the ABA decreases the
amount of time spent in class and increases the effective
hourly wage of law faculty.
As with the limitations on the number of hours taught,
strong arguments could be made that the sabbatical require-
ment increases the quality of teaching. The potential for
abuse, however, still exists. In order to alleviate this concern,
the ABA should continue to require that law schools provide
leaves of absence but should not require paid sabbaticals.
Rather, each institution should decide the issue of paid sab-
baticals during negotiations with its faculty. Faculty at a
given school, for instance, may be willing to trade paid sabbat-
icals for higher salaries in non-sabbatical years. In any event,
by removing the issue of compensation from the sabbatical
requirement, the ABA would allow faculty wages to be deter-
mined more by the market and less by accrediting authorities.
Although not addressed in the consent decree, other aspects
of the standards can be characterized as attempts at salary
207. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 5, Standard 405(b).
208. 60 Fed. Reg. 39,421, 39,425 (1995).
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augmentation. The standards mandate certain amenities for
faculty, such as private offices for each faculty member 20 9 and
secretarial assistance. 20 The ABA has interpreted these
requirements to include access to on-line services. 21' The ABA
also has interpreted Standard 405 to require that faculty
members be allowed to retain copyrights over scholarly
work.2" 2 The requirement that faculty be provided with private
offices, secretarial assistance, and on-line resources seems
almost trivial, because schools almost certainly would provide
these services even if the ABA did not require them. The
requirement that faculty retain their copyrights, however, may
be of more concern. Copyrights for casebooks and treatises are
potentially valuable, and faculty could use their copyrights to
supplement income. By requiring that faculty retain their
copyrights, the ABA may be using this standard to elevate
faculty salaries above the market rate. Further, the retention
of copyrights by faculty, although an incentive for high quality
scholarly research, does nothing to ensure the quality of
education at a law school. Therefore, the ABA should drop any
requirement concerning copyrights and allow the issue to be
determined by each institution.
6. Standards 201, 209, and 210: Law School Resources-
Standard 201 requires that law schools have "resources
necessary to provide a sound legal education."" 3 Likewise,
Standard 209 requires that "Itihe present and anticipated
financial resources of the law school shall be adequate to
sustain a sound educational program,"" 4 and Standard 210
encourages law school affiliation with a university.215 Interpre-
tations of these standards state that law schools cannot be
overly dependent on tuition income,21 6 that a parent university
cannot assess high overhead costs to a law school," 7 and that
a parent university cannot withhold "excessive portions of
revenue which should be available to the school of law."
21 8
209. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 5, Standard 703.
210. Id. Standard 405(c).
211. Id. Interpretation of Standard 405(b).
212. Id. Interpretation 8 of Standard 405.
213. Id. Standard 201(b).
214. Id. Standard 209.
215. Id. Standard 210.
216. Id. Interpretation 2 of Standard 201; Interpretation 1 of Standards 201 and
209.
217. Id. Interpretation 2 of Standards 201, 209, and 210.
218. Id. Interpretation of Standard 210.
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The requirement of "adequate" resources and the prohibition
of dependence on tuition income could act as barriers to entry
for new law schools and proprietary law schools. That is, a
new law school or a proprietary law school is unlikely to have
a substantial endowment and will necessarily be dependent on
tuition income. For-profit schools, in particular, would be
almost totally dependent on tuition income, because few
individuals would likely donate money to a for-profit enter-
prise. Because the consent decree prohibits the ABA from
refusing to accredit proprietary law schools,219 the ABA should
not be allowed to accomplish the same result by requiring that
schools be substantially independent of tuition income. There-
fore, the ABA should drop any requirement that a law school
have a substantial endowment or be free from dependence on
tuition income.
Although the ABA does not state any reason for intervening
in the relationship between a law school and its parent univer-
sity, these interpretations may have been created to give law
school faculty additional bargaining power in negotiations
with the parent university. Law schools tend to be "cash
cows," 220 and the parent university often may attempt to ex-
tract revenue generated by the law school. The Interpretations
of Standards 201, 209, and 210, however, provide leverage to
a law school in countering such an extraction by asserting that
it threatens the law school's accreditation. Although these
Interpretations may give law faculty a stronger negotiating
position, they do not present an antitrust problem. If any-
thing, the prohibition on extractions reduces the cost of legal
education by increasing the law school's assets.
CONCLUSION
Economists contend that any time an industry engages in
self-regulation, the regulators eventually will act in the
interests of the regulated instead of the public.22' The regula-
tion of law schools by the ABA is no exception. One may argue
219. 60 Fed. Reg. 39,422 (1995).
220. See Henry Ramsey, Jr., The History, Organization, and Accomplishments of
the American Bar Association Accreditation Process, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 267,
277 (1995).
221. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM & FREEDOM 29 (1962).
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that the public needs protection from incompetent lawyers and
that accreditation is one means of promoting quality in the
market for lawyers. However, the current accreditation stan-
dards have less to do with the quality of legal education than
with the promotion of faculty goals.
Several of the accreditation requirements, such as those
affecting faculty salaries and teaching hours, are the types of
restrictions that the Supreme Court has deemed illegal in the
past. First, these restrictions raise the price and reduce the
output of a service. Under current precedent, a "quality"
justification would not exonerate these standards. Second,
other standards, such as the requirement of the use of the
LSAT and the prohibition of for-credit bar review courses,
potentially affect markets other than the market for legal
education. Finally, some standards, such as the library re-
quirements could be used to police the cartel and eliminate
price cutters.
The ABA should modify its accreditation standards so that
ABA accreditation ensures the quality of education that a law
school provides for its students, not the quality of life it
provides for its faculty. In modifying its standards, the ABA
needs to establish a close link between each standard and a
legitimate educational goal.
Most importantly, courts should hold that the antitrust laws
apply to the ABA's accreditation activities. As the only
accreditor of law schools, the ABA is the gatekeeper to the
legal profession. Although this power may be used to prevent
unqualified persons from practicing law, it also can be used to
secure monopoly rents for those already in the profession. By
subjecting ABA accreditation standards to rule of reason
scrutiny, courts would force the ABA to prove that the stan-
dards serve the public good and not merely the good of legal
academia.
